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ABSTRACT
The bar examination has long loomed over legal education. Although many
states formerly admitted law school graduates into legal practice via the
diploma privilege, Wisconsin is the only state that recognizes the privilege
today. The bar exam is so central to the attorney admissions process that all but
a handful of jurisdictions required it amidst a pandemic that turned bar exam
administration into a life-or-death matter.
In this Article, I analyze the diploma privilege from a historical and empirical perspective. Whereas courts and regulators maintain that bar exams screen
out incompetent practitioners, the legal profession formerly placed little emphasis on bar exams and viewed them as superfluous for graduates of accredited law
schools. The organized bar turned against the diploma privilege as the legal profession began to diversify, and some states abolished the diploma privilege specifically to block Black law students from the profession. The notion that bar
exams ensure a base level of competence is a relatively recent construct.
A few studies have suggested that attorneys who struggle on the bar exam
are more likely to commit misconduct. However, drawing on cross-state attorney complaint and charge data as well as Wisconsin attorney disciplinary
cases, I demonstrate that the bar exam requirement has no effect on attorney
misconduct. The complaint rate against Wisconsin attorneys is similar to that of
other jurisdictions, and Wisconsin attorneys are charged with misconduct less
often than attorneys in most other states. Moreover, the rate of public discipline
against Wisconsin attorneys who were admitted via the diploma privilege is the
same as that of Wisconsin attorneys admitted via bar exams.
Bar exams as currently constituted do little to advance public protection. A carefully drafted and enacted diploma privilege would comply with the Constitution’s
* Professor of Law and Presidential Impact Fellow, Texas A&M University School of Law. The author
would like to thank Meina Heydari and Alexia Nicoloulias for their research assistance. Rob Anderson, Darren
Bush, Elizabeth Chambliss, Derek Muller, Susan Fortney, Gabriele Plickert, and Peter Yu provided valuable
insights. © 2022, Milan Markovic.
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Dormant Commerce Clause and would incentivize law schools to better prepare
students for practice. States also have more direct means to address attorney misconduct than relying on ex ante measures such as bar exams.
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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no rite of passage is as reviled as the bar examination. Every year, tens
of thousands of freshly minted law school graduates pour into convention centers
and lecture halls to begin a two- or three-day ordeal that has little relation to any
task that they will perform in legal practice. Most will pass on their first attempts.
Others on subsequent attempts. However, for a small minority, the bar exam will
prove to be an insurmountable barrier.1
U.S. bar exams date to the post-colonial period when lawyers were subjected
to few educational requirements.2 Early iterations of bar exams were “brief,
1. See Jane Yakowitz, Marooned: An Empirical Investigation of Law School Graduates Who Fail the Bar
Exam, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 16–17 (2010). See generally Linda F. Wightman, LSAC NATIONAL
LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY 31 (1998) (estimating that only five percent of graduates from ABAaccredited law schools sit for the bar exam and never pass it). Including graduates of non-ABA accredited law
schools leads to higher estimates. Id. at 14.
2. RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 51–52 (1989); see, e.g., Daniel Hansen, Do We Need the Bar
Exam? A Critical Evaluation of the Justifications for the Bar Exam and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W.
RSRV. L. REV. 1191, 1194 (1995).
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perfunctory, and oral.”3 Abraham Lincoln once administered an Illinois candidate’s bar exam while drawing a bath.4 Aspiring lawyers could avoid the bar
exam entirely by clerking in a law office.5
The bar exam is no longer an informal affair. The National Conference of Bar
Examiners (NCBE) produces a three-part written exam consisting of the multistate bar exam (MBE), the multistate essay exam (MEE), and the multistate performance test (MPT).6 The Uniform Bar Exam (UBE), which has been adopted
by thirty-six states, is a compilation of these exams.7 All jurisdictions except for
Louisiana require at least the MBE.8
Aspiring lawyers must also generally complete four years of college and graduate from an American Bar Association (ABA)-accredited law school to sit for
the bar exam.9 Although thirty-two states and the District of Columbia formerly
admitted graduates of certain law schools into practice without bar exams,10
Wisconsin is the only state that currently recognizes the “diploma privilege.”11
Despite jurisdictions’ longstanding embrace of bar exams, critics have long
questioned their utility.12 Since the content of bar exams overlaps with what has
been taught in law school, they are arguably a useless extra expense.13 Bar exams
also test general legal knowledge in an era of rampant attorney specialization14
and place inordinate emphasis on speed and memorization, skills upon which
attorneys should rarely rely in practice.15 Many core lawyer functions such as oral
3. ABEL, supra note 2, at 5.
4. Hansen, supra note 2, at 1196 (citation omitted).
5. Id. at 1194–95.
6. Marsha Griggs, Building A Better Bar Exam, 7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2019).
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 14.
9. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for
Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 431 (2001); Robert M. Jarvis, An Anecdotal History of
the Bar Exam, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 359, 359 (1996).
10. Claudia Angelos, Sara Berman, Mary Lu Bilek, Carol Chomsky, Andrea A. Curcio, Marsha Griggs,
Joan W. Howarth, Eileen Kaufman, Deborah Jones Merritt, Patricia E. Salkin & Judith Wegner, Diploma
Privilege, and the Constitution, 73 S.M.U. L. REV. F. 168, 170 (2020); see Thomas W. Goldman, Use of the
Diploma Privilege in the United States, 10 TULSA L.J. 36, 39 (1974).
11. For an excellent discussion of Wisconsin’s program, see Beverly Moran, The Wisconsin Diploma
Privilege: Try It, You’ll Like It, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 645 (2000). New Hampshire recently created an exception
for the small number of attorneys who complete the Daniel Webster program at the University of New
Hampshire School of Law. See also Joan W. Howarth, The Professional Responsibility Case for Valid and
Nondiscriminatory Bar Exams, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 931, 934–35 (2021).
12. See Ben Bratman, Improving the Performance of the Performance Test: The Key to Meaningful Bar
Exam Reform, 83 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 565, 565 (2015) (noting critiques of bar exam as “useless” and a “waste of
time”). See generally Lorenzo A. Trujillo, The Relationship Between Law School and the Bar Exam: A Look at
Assessment and Student Success, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 69, 77–79 (2007) (summarizing main critiques).
13. Carol Goforth, Why the Bar Exam Fails to Raise the Bar, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 47, 50 (2015) (citation
omitted); see Hansen, supra note 2, at 1206.
14. See Trujillo, supra note 12, at 80; see also Goforth, supra note 13, at 50.
15. See William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The Surprising and
Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. L. REV. 975, 1038 (2004) (questioning connection between
rapid analysis and attorney competence as tested on the bar exam). See generally Trujillo, supra note 12, at
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communication, counseling, and negotiation are ignored entirely.16 Moreover,
although attorney admission is state-by-state, bar exams either do not test state laws
and procedures or give them short shrift.17 As a recent task force of the New York
Bar Association concluded: “[T]he adoption of the UBE has had the . . . consequence of rendering applicants less, not more, equipped to meet the challenges of
practicing law in New York.”18
Bar exams are also major obstacles to diversifying the legal profession. Black,
Hispanic, and Asian test takers have historically failed bar exams at higher rates
than white takers, partly explaining why the legal profession remains whitedominated.19 Commentators have argued that, were bar exams subject to Title
VII scrutiny, they would be struck down because of their unproven validity and
disparate impact on minority groups.20 Although courts have consistently rejected
constitutional challenges to jurisdictions’ use of bar exams, they have voiced concerns about arbitrary grading and unscientific selections of “cut scores,” the
scores that candidates need to pass their exams.21 Because bar exams are challenging without ensuring that candidates are prepared to represent actual clients,
commentators have charged that their primary purpose is to limit competition in
the legal field and protect (predominately white) incumbents.22 Past leaders of the
legal profession have acknowledged as much.23
78–79 (“A good lawyer does not rely solely on memory. Rather, she relies on legal research, and may be subject to sanctions or malpractice claims if she attempts to rely solely on memory.”).
16. See, e.g., Goforth, supra note 13, at 65; Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: Rethinking
Admission to the Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696, 1710 (2001).
17. Thirty-six states have adopted the Uniform Bar Exam that does not test state law. See Griggs, supra note
6, at 3; see also Trujillo, supra note 12, at 80 (“A state’s bar exam cannot possibly measure a lawyer’s minimal
competence to understand and use legal rules of that state if that state’s legal rules are not addressed on the test
itself.”).
18. N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE NEW
YORK BAR EXAM 2 (2020), https://nysba.org/app/uploads/2020/04/Report-Task-Force-on-the-New-York-BarExam-April-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G34-BXTF].
19. See, e.g., Milan Markovic & Gabriele Plickert, The Paradox of Minority Attorney Satisfaction, 60 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2019); Timothy T. Clydesdale, A Forked River Runs Through Law School: Toward
Understanding Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and Bar Passage, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 711, 712–13 (2004).
20. See Howarth, supra note 11, at 934.
21. Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 749–51 (4th Cir. 1976); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1106
(5th Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 9, at 446; George B. Shepherd, No African-American Lawyers Allowed:
The Inefficient Racism of the ABA’s Accreditation of Law Schools, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 110 (2003); see also
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Knots in the Pipeline for Prospective Lawyers of Color: The LSAT Is Not the Problem
and Affirmative Action Is Not the Answer, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 379 (2013) (“Almost all would agree that
the individual state bar exams act as a severe impediment to certain members of underrepresented minority
groups becoming practicing attorneys.”).
23. See William C. Kidder, The Bar Examination and the Dream Deferred: A Critical Analysis of the MBE,
Social Closure, and Racial and Ethnic Stratification, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 547, 556 (2004); Shepherd, supra note 22, at 5 (“The reason that many state bar officials provided for decreasing the pass rate was to eliminate “overcrowding” in the profession – that is, to reduce competition [from minority attorneys] for existing
lawyers.”).
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Scholars have proposed many improvements to bar exams,24 and the NCBE
continues to evaluate how to best assess the knowledge and skills required of
practicing attorneys.25 While these efforts are worthwhile, and the bar exam could
certainly be improved upon, the reality is that no exam will ever be able to reflect
the myriad of functions that attorneys perform and the full range of capacities
that they should ideally possess.26 As a result, the chief argument for bar exams
since their inception has not been that they assess lawyerly acumen and skill, but
that they screen out incompetent practitioners.27 As the Eleventh Circuit has
expressed: “[A] state . . . adopts a rebuttable presumption of incompetence . . .
[and] then essentially adopts [it] as fact as to those individuals who fail the
examination.”28
Even the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic failed to loosen the
bar exam’s grip on the attorney admission process. Most states held in-person bar
exams in 2020, with some states requiring test-takers to sign liability waivers.29
Other states held online bar exams marred by technological and security challenges.30 Four states followed in Wisconsin’s footsteps and embraced a limited
diploma privilege in 2020, which they terminated in 2021.31 Jurisdictions appear
24. See, e.g., Bratman, supra note 12, at 565–66; Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the
Existing Bar Exam Should Change, 81 NEB. L. REV. 364, 364–365 (2002).
25. See NCBE, BAR ADMISSIONS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: EVALUATING OPTIONS FOR THE
CLASS OF 2020 at 5–6 (2020), https://thebarexaminer.ncbex.org/wp-content/uploads/Bar-Admissions-Duringthe-COVID-19-Pandemic_NCBE-white-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MZZ-REBR] [hereinafter NCBE]
(detailing efforts to validate and update the bar exam).
26. See N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N, supra note 18, at 2; see also Barton, supra note 9, at 446 (“It is difficult . . . to
mandate one course of study or one exam that will successfully guarantee any set level of competence.”).
27. See, e.g., Gary S. Rosin, Unpacking the Bar: Of Cut Scores and Competence, 32 J. LEGAL PRO. 67, 67
(2008) (“The primary purpose of the bar exam is to ensure the minimum competence of persons admitted to the
practice of law.”); Michael S. Ariens, The NCBE’s Wrong-Headed Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic 3
(Apr. 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3587751
[https://perma.cc/L8YU-PG4K] (“The story the NCBE tells is that it serves as a backstop preventing the
admission of incompetent bar applicants.”); cf. Curcio, supra note 24, at 366 (describing the notion that the bar
exams screens for competence as a “pretense”).
28. Jones v. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 737 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1984).
29. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Two States Introduce COVID-19 Waivers for July Bar Exams, AM. BAR
ASS’N J. (June 2, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/liability-waivers-may-not-mean-much-buttwo-states-include-them-for-july-in-person-bar-exam [https://perma.cc/5UY7-B5P8].
30. For a general account of the technological challenges and disruptions during the July administration, see
Karen Sloan, First Online Bar Exam Marred by Tech Problems, LAW.COM (July 28, 2020), https://www.law.
com/2020/07/28/first-online-bar-exam-marred-by-tech-problems/ [https://perma.cc/ZAG7-ZRCP]; Stephanie
Francis Ward & Lyle Moran, Thousands of California Bar Exam Takers Have Video Files Flagged for Review,
AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/thousands-of-california-bar-examtakers-have-video-files-flagged-for-review [https://perma.cc/6B8P-LM7Q].
31. See July 2020 Bar Exam: Jurisdiction Information, NCBE, https://www.ncbex.org/ncbe-covid-19updates/july-2020-bar-exam-jurisdiction-information/ [https://perma.cc/K99X-3SBZ] (last updated Sept. 24,
2020); see also Stephanie Francis Ward, Jurisdictions with COVID-19-Related Diploma Privilege Are Going
Back to Bar Exam Admissions, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/
jurisdictions-with-covid-related-diploma-privilege-going-back-to-bar-exam-admissions [https://perma.cc/
F5JC-3QE6] (noting that all four states that recognized an emergency diploma privilege, plus the District of
Columbia, plan to proceed with bar exams in July 2021).
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to have been swayed by the NCBE’s argument that, notwithstanding the COVID19 threat, bar exams are needed to serve as a “final check” on law school graduates.32 For example, in rejecting the diploma privilege for 2020 graduates seeking
admission in Nevada, the state’s supreme court reasoned that the privilege would
fail to “adequately protect the public against practitioners who have not established minimal competence.”33
Surprisingly, few studies have assessed whether bar exams do in fact protect
the public.34 One study of the Tennessee bar and another of the Connecticut bar
observed that lawyers who failed bar exams are more likely to go on to have disciplinary records.35 Professors Anderson and Muller’s recent study of California
lawyers similarly finds a negative correlation between bar exam scores and attorney discipline.36 But even assuming that the utility of bar exams should be measured via attorney misconduct rates, this literature raises more questions than
answers. How can one’s performance on the bar exam, usually taken at the beginning of one’s legal career, predict misconduct years into the future? Could the
relationship between the bar exam and discipline be explained by other factors,
such as differences in practice settings? In addition, most attorney discipline is
also unrelated to competence,37 and jurisdictions already use the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE) and the character and fitness inquiry
to screen out unethical attorneys.38
In this Article, I scrutinize the bar exam’s public protection rationale from both
a historical and empirical perspective. Although bar exams are now viewed as
tests of minimal competence, prominent lawyers and law schools originally
32. See NCBE, supra note 25, at 3.
33. Order Approving Modified July 2020 Nevada Bar Examination at 2, (Nev. May 20, 2020), https://www.
ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F252 [https://perma.cc/CML2-BN93].
34. See Deborah J. Merritt, Lowell L. Hargens & Barbara F. Reskin, Raising the Bar: A Social Science
Critique of Recent Increases to Passing Scores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 931 (2001); see also
ST. BAR CAL., AMENDED COVER LETTER TO THE FINAL REPORT ON THE 2017 CALIFORNIA BAR EXAM 2 (2017)
(“No clear measure or definition for public protection in the context of a licensing exam has been
established.”).
35. Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Is Bar Exam Failure a Harbinger of Professional Discipline?, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
883, 885 (2017); Leslie C. Levin, Christine Zozula & Peter Siegelman, A Study of the Relationship Between
Bar Admissions Data and Subsequent Lawyer Discipline, LSAC (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.lsac.org/dataresearch/research/study-relationship-between-bar-admissions-data-and-subsequent-lawyer [https://perma.cc/
97RX-GYQK].
36. Robert Anderson IV & Derek T. Muller, The High Cost of Lowering the Bar, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
307, 307 (2019).
37. See generally Levin, Zozula & Siegelman, supra note 35, at 14 (reporting that only 4% of violations in
Connecticut involve the duty of competence).
38. Of course, the MPRE and character and fitness inquiry have their own drawbacks. See, e.g., Leslie C.
Levin, The MPRE Reconsidered, 86 KY. L.J. 395, 397 (1998) (suggesting that the MPRE contributes to the trivialization of ethics and tests rules that are irrelevant to most practitioners); Carol M. Langford, Barbarians at
the Bar: Regulations of the Legal Profession Through the Admissions Process, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1193, 1195
(2008) (noting inherent indeterminacy and subjectivity in state bars’ assessments of “moral character”).
However, they are at least designed with ethical conduct in mind and there is evidence that they affect misconduct rates. See infra Part IV.
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advocated for written bar exams because they feared overcrowding in the legal
profession and were especially concerned with the prospect of immigrants and
minority groups benefitting from the diploma privilege.39 While legal education
has changed and the profession is, at least nominally, far more committed to diversity, the bar exam has never been more of a fixture of the attorney admissions
landscape; this is despite the dearth of evidence indicating that it improves lawyer
training or advances public protection. Jurisdictions can reconsider bar exams as
the sole means of entry into the legal profession and reconstitute the diploma
privilege without jeopardizing the public.
In Part I, I provide a brief history of the diploma privilege and bar exams.
States abrogated the diploma privilege to stunt the growth of new law schools
that generally had less rigorous admission criteria and predominately served
immigrants and racial minorities.40 Bar exams were never intended to culminate
lawyers’ educations, and some jurisdictions only began to require them to avoid
extending the diploma privilege to Black law students.
I examine the contemporary public protection justification for the bar exam in
Part II, including recent studies that find a correlation between the bar exam and
ethical misconduct. Candidates’ performance in law schools is highly predictive
of bar passage and passing the bar exam is largely a matter of persistence because
most states do not limit attempts.41 There may be a relationship between bar
exam performance and discipline, but this does not signify that the bar exam
requirement has a direct effect on discipline. The legal profession is highly stratified, and the correlation between bar exam performance and misconduct is likely
attributable to lawyers’ differential practice settings, which are based, in large
part, on their academic records.
I argue in Part III that if the bar exam were to have a significant impact on attorney misconduct, one would expect more complaints and discipline against attorneys
in states that recognize the diploma privilege. But Wisconsin is an average state in
terms of complaints against attorneys and better-than-average in terms of charges
filed. While these cross-state comparisons are not definitive, I also demonstrate
using Wisconsin disciplinary decisions that the rate of public discipline against
Wisconsin attorneys who were admitted via the diploma privilege is also no higher
than that of Wisconsin attorneys who qualified via bar exams.42
Lastly, in Part IV I consider how the diploma privilege can be adapted to the
modern era. To survive constitutional challenge, states should structure the
diploma privilege to incentivize law schools to prepare students for practice in
39. See infra Part I; Goldman, supra note 10, at 41.
40. See Hansen, supra note 2, at 1201–02; ABEL, supra note 2, at 62 (“[T]he profession opposed the privilege because it surrendered control over supply to the academy and increased the flood of new entrants.”).
41. The national record for bar exam attempts is held by Maxcy D. Filer, who passed on his forty-eighth
attempt. See Kinsler, supra note 35, at 883; see also ABEL, supra note 2, at 72 (“[T]he persistent always have a
good chance of ultimate success.”).
42. See infra Part III(B).
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local legal markets and not to protect in-state institutions. Reintroducing the
diploma privilege would also allow jurisdictions to shift resources from bar
administration to the improvement of ethics training and discipline. The bar
exam has long outlived its purpose and is incompatible with a dynamic and diversified legal profession.

I. BAR EXAMS AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE
For much of American history, lawyers were largely unregulated.43 Virtually
any white man could practice law, and many lawyers had not even completed
high school.44 The development of the bar exam and diploma privilege must be
understood in the context of lawyers’ efforts to professionalize attorney admissions and make the practice of law more akin to medicine.45
During the 1800s, legal education was in its infancy.46 The apprenticeship was
the dominant mode of admission into the legal profession.47 The relatively few
law schools that existed graduated small numbers of lawyers.48 For example,
Harvard Law School, founded in 1817, enrolled an average of nine students per
year during its first thirty years.49 Only twenty percent of practicing attorneys in
1891 had attended law schools.50 A key part of the professionalization project
was to shift from an apprenticeship-based model of attorney admission to an
education-based model. The legal profession decided to associate with law
schools and universities to standardize training and to attain greater status.51
But law schools continued to suffer from low enrollments because the bar
exam was not a meaningful barrier to entry.52 To gain admission, applicants to
the bar merely had to sit through six or seven minutes of a local judge’s cursory
questioning.53 Standards were nonexistent:
Until 1885 what semblance there was of a “law exam” varied as the number of
judges who administered them. No uniform standard by which to measure an
applicant’s learning or ability existed and naturally the ideas of the circuit
judges as to what was “sufficient learning in the law” varied greatly.54
43. Barton, supra note 9, at 429; see ABEL, supra note 2, at 6.
44. See ABEL, supra note 2, at 63, 72.
45. See id. at 41.
46. See Goldman, supra note 10, at 39; ABEL, supra note 2, at 42.
47. ABEL, supra note 2, at 40.
48. See id.; Hansen, supra note 2, at 1198.
49. ABEL, supra note 2, at 42.
50. See id. at 41.
51. See Richard Abel, The Rise of Professionalism, 6 BRIT. J. L. & SOC’Y. 82, 87 (1979); Hansen, supra
note 2, at 1998.
52. See generally Goldman, supra note 10, at 39 (“[I]f, as was usually the case, the exam did not amount to
anything, applicants could pass it without attending [law] school.”).
53. See ABEL, supra note 2, at 62–63; see also Hansen, supra note 2, at 1196 (describing bar exams as “inadequate because courts neither had the time nor the skills to administer a professional exam”).
54. See Richard A. Stack Jr., Attorneys: Admission Upon Diploma to the Wisconsin Bar, 58 MARQ. L. REV.
109, 118 (1975).
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One judge’s testing of an Illinois candidate—a former butcher—consisted
of questions about brandy, Blackstone, and the authorship of Shakespeare’s
works.55
To increase interest in legal education, law schools sought and obtained legislative enactments to allow their graduates to practice without taking bar exams.56
Virginia enacted the first diploma privilege in 1842 for graduates of William and
Mary and the University of Virginia.57 The privilege was introduced thereafter
in Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, New York, Tennessee, Michigan, and
Wisconsin.58 At the diploma privilege’s zenith, sixteen jurisdictions admitted law
school graduates via the privilege,59 with most states bestowing the privilege only
on graduates of in-state law schools.60 Thirty-two states recognized the privilege
at some juncture.61
The governmental imprimatur of the diploma privilege boosted law schools’
popularity and made them viable alternatives to apprenticeships.62 However, only
after states began to replace informal, oral exams with written bar exams did
enrollments in law schools—and particularly ones that were afforded the diploma
privilege—soar.63 By the early 1900s, most attorneys had attended law schools,
and apprenticeships were an ancillary means of admission.64
Rather than conferring greater status and prestige, the shift to an educationbased model of attorney admissions had the unintended consequence of democratizing the legal profession because law schools had minimal admission criteria.65
New law schools proliferated, many of which held classes in the evenings and
served working class, immigrant, and minority communities.66 The organized bar
was contemptuous of these evening law schools, claiming that they were

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Robert Sprecher, Admission to Law in Illinois, 46 ILL. L. REV. 811, 817 (1952).
Goldman, supra note 10, at 39.
Id.
Id. at 40.
See ABEL, supra note 2, at 62; William D. Mallard Jr., Bar Admission and the Diploma Privilege, 1
CUMB. L. REV. 98, 101 (1970).
60. Goldman, supra note 10, at 40. Texas was a prominent exception, affording the privileges to graduates
of all ABA-accredited law schools. Id. at 42.
61. See Angelos et al., supra note 10, at 170; Moran, supra note 11, at 646.
62. See ABEL, supra note 2, at 39; see also Robert B. Stevens, Law Schools and Legal Education, 1879–
1979: Lectures in Honor of 100 Years of Valparaiso Law School, 14 VAL. U. L. REV. 179 (1980) (noting that
the diploma privilege stamped a law school with state approval).
63. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 2, at 43 (noting effect of privilege on the University of Wisconsin Law
School); see also Wallace E. Jr. Sturgis, Abolition of the Diploma Privilege, 4 U. FLA. L. REV. 370, 376 (1951)
(attributing forty-two percent growth in enrollments in Florida law schools during the 1950s to the diploma
privilege).
64. ABEL, supra note 2, at 52.
65. See id. at 49–50; Hansen, supra note 2, at 1200–01.
66. See ABEL, supra note 2, at 53; see also Dorothy E. Finnegan, Raising and Leveling the Bar: Standards,
Access, and the YMCA Evening Law Schools, 1890–1940, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 208, 208–09 (2005) (describing
rapid growth of the student bodies of part-time law schools vis-a-vis more prestigious university-affiliated law
schools).
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“irredeemably low-grade” and responsible for “overcrowding” in the profession.67 The white protestant leadership of the bar had little in common with the
graduates of these upstart law schools and feared that their influx undermined the
legal profession’s “American ideals” and “professional spirit.”68
The organized bar embarked on a multipronged strategy to shut down evening
law schools. They lobbied states to require law schools to tighten admission criteria and to admit only students with college educations and eventually to restrict
the practice of law to graduates of ABA-approved law schools.69 But a crucial
first step in this campaign was the elimination of the diploma privilege.70 Bar
leaders—and even some law schools that benefited from the privilege—argued
that it was a matter of time before states would extend the privilege to graduates
of evening law schools, allegedly jeopardizing the quality of the practicing bar.71
They intimated that virtually anyone could organize a law school and obtain students by advertising the diploma privilege.72 For example, in 1932, the Dean of
the University of Pennsylvania School of Law opined that, “[i]t would be most
unfortunate if any Tom, Dick, or Harry . . . could start a law school and grind out
graduates who would forthwith be admitted into the practice of law without further test of fitness.”73 Two evening law schools did ultimately benefit from the
diploma privilege for a short period of time.74
The ABA first condemned the diploma privilege in 1921 and the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) followed suit a few years later.75 Whereas fifteen states recognized the diploma privilege in 1949, only five states recognized
it by 1970: Mississippi, Montana, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.76
All of these states, save Wisconsin, abolished the privilege in the 1980s.77
Some jurisdictions that abolished the diploma privilege expressly sought to
limit the access of “socially undesirable elements” to the legal profession.78
Alabama had granted the privilege to graduates of the University of Alabama

67. Alfred Z. Reed, Legal Education, 1925-1928, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 765, 776 (1930); Finnegan, supra
note 66, at 229; see also Mark E. Steiner, The Secret History of Proprietary Legal Education: The Case of the
Houston Law School, 1919-1945, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 341, 359 (1997) (noting that concerns about overcrowding
were rooted in economic protectionism as well as the fear that overcrowding leads to more unethical conduct).
68. Shepherd, supra note 22, at 111; Stevens, supra note 62, at 199.
69. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 111; Abel, supra note 2, at 72; Finnegan, supra note 66, at 212.
70. See R. Scott Baker, The Paradoxes of Desegregation: Race, Class, and Education, 1935–1975, 109 AM.
J. EDUC. 320, 330 (2001); see also Reed, supra note 67, at 774 (bemoaning the popularity of the “so-called
diploma privilege”).
71. See Mallard Jr., supra note 59, at 104; Goldman, supra note 10, at 41.
72. See Sprecher, supra note 55, at 842.
73. Herbert F. Goodrich, Law Schools and Bar Examiners, 18 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 101, 101 (1932).
74. Finnegan, supra note 66, at 227.
75. Goldman, supra note 10, at 41 (citation omitted).
76. See Kyle Rozema, Does the Bar Exam Protect the Public, 18 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 801, 808
(2021).
77. Id. at 802.
78. Baker, supra note 70, at 330.
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Law School through the 1950s.79 However, after the United States Supreme
Court ruled that states were required to provide equal legal educational opportunities to white and Black students, the University of Alabama still refused to
enroll Black students in its law school.80 Instead, Alabama paid to send Black students out-of-state.81 When they returned as law school graduates, they had to sit
for the bar exam because they had not graduated from an in-state law school.82
Alabama moved quickly to abolish the diploma privilege in 1961 when a second
accredited law school moved to the state.83
Other southern states also changed their positions on the privilege to block law
school graduates from the legal profession.84 South Carolina formed a separate
law school for Black law students in 1947 instead of integrating the University of
South Carolina School of Law.85 Immediately before the law school graduated its
first class in 1950, South Carolina abolished its diploma privilege.86 The Speaker
of the South Carolina Senate was unequivocal: the purpose of the new bar exam
requirement was to “bar Negroes and some undesirable whites.”87 Florida similarly abrogated its diploma privilege after establishing the Florida A&M
University School of Law to serve Black students in 1949.88
Since the opposition to the diploma privilege has been rooted historically in
protectionism and racism, there is reason to be skeptical of states’ decisions to
mandate bar exams. But the history is also relevant because there is scant evidence that the bar exam was ever intended as a test of “minimal competence.”89
Indeed, bar leaders were skeptical of the bar exam’s value.90 As the Dean of
Duke University Law School wrote in 1939:
The raising of educational requirements in most states to comply with the
standards set by the American Bar Association has undoubtedly brought a better quality of applicant to the bar exams but that the bar exams have done
much to encourage a better legal education in law schools is doubtful.91

79. See id.
80. See Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938).
81. Baker, supra note 70, at 330.
82. See id.; see also Ex parte Banks, 48 So. 2d 35, 36 (Ala. 1950) (holding that Black law school graduates
were not entitled to the diploma privilege even though they did not have the option of attending the University
of Alabama).
83. See SOLOMON SEAY, JR., JIM CROW AND ME: STORIES FROM MY LIFE AS A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 11
(2008).
84. See Edward J. Littlejohn & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Black Enrollment in Law Schools: Forward to the
Past, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 415, 430 (1986).
85. Baker, supra note 70, at 330–31.
86. Id. at 331.
87. Id.
88. Rachel L. Gregory, Florida’s Bar Exam: Ensuring Racial Disparity, Not Competence, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 771, 773 (2005) (citation omitted).
89. See Stack Jr., supra note 54, at 122.
90. Id. at 121–22.
91. Id. at 122.
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His Northwestern University School of Law counterpart similarly opined at the
time that bar exams lacked “great professional significance.”92
The organized bar also regarded bar exams as superfluous for graduates of
ABA-accredited law schools.93 These law schools generally had tighter admission standards than their unaccredited counterparts, and bar leaders reasoned that
graduates of the former would have little trouble with bar exams.94 As explained
by the AALS President in 1938, accredited law schools nevertheless had no
choice but to oppose the privilege because they feared that it would not be limited
to “good law schools.”95
Ultimately, the organized bar prevailed in its campaign against unaccredited
law schools. In 1935, only nine jurisdictions required graduation from an ABAaccredited law school; by 1979, that number rose to forty-six.96 Attendance in
unaccredited law schools has since fallen precipitously, and few such law schools
exist outside of California.97 Whereas lawyers once had little formal education,
most lawyers now must complete four years of college and three years at an
ABA-accredited law school prior to sitting for the bar exam.98 Competition for
admission to law school is “intense,”99 and the ABA prohibits law schools from
taking chances on students who do not “appear capable of satisfactorily completing its program of legal education and being admitted to the bar.”100
Although law schools are heavily regulated and barely resemble those of yesteryear, the bar exam has never been more of a fixture of the attorney admissions
landscape. The organized bar’s continuing fear of “overcrowding” and competition undoubtedly play a role. But these concerns hardly justify the maintenance
of bar exams as barriers to professional entry. The next Part examines the bar
exam’s public protection rationale and the evidence offered in support thereof.

II. BAR EXAMS AND ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT
When the organized bar began to advocate for bar exams and against the
diploma privilege, it did not explicitly focus on public protection. The ABA’s
1921 condemnation of the diploma privilege only stated that “every candidate

92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Stack Jr., supra note 54, at 121; Herschell Whitfield Arant, A Survey of Legal Education in the
South, 15 TENN. L. REV. 179, 183 (1938); Goodrich, supra note 73, at 101 (“In case of institutions whose high
reputation has become established through years of competent performance, there would be little or no danger
to the profession if their graduates were to be admitted to the bar without further examination.”).
94. See Goodrich, supra note 73, at 101.
95. Arant, supra note 93, at 183.
96. ABEL, supra note 2, at 55.
97. See id. at 56. California separately regulates law schools that are not accredited by the ABA and requires
candidates from these law schools to take a separate bar exam after completing their first years of law school.
See Steven R. Smith, Gresham’s Law in Legal Education, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 171, 179–81 (2008).
98. ABEL, supra note 2, at 5.
99. Id.
100. ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS R. 501(b) (2019–2020).
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should be subjected to an exam by public authority to determine his fitness.”101
Subsequent ABA statements focused on the inconsistent standards among law
schools and the desirability of objective third-party assessments of attorney competence.102 The NCBE expounded on these themes in a 2020 white paper:
Diploma privilege in effect removes the public protection function vested in
the courts and places it with the law schools, but with no independent, vetted,
objective, or consistent final check on whether graduates are in fact competent
to provide legal services. The public, and certainly legal employers, rely on
passage of the bar exam as a reliable indicator of whether graduates are ready
to begin practice.103

Thus, the main arguments for bar exams are that they protect the public by separating competent practitioners from incompetent ones104 and that law schools
cannot be trusted to attest as to their graduates’ competence.105
Courts have generally accepted that bar exams guarantee some level of attorney competence.106 Whether they are a “reliable indicator” is more contentious.
Lawyers take bar exams at the beginning of their careers; any effect on their competence or general fitness to practice would presumably fade over time.107 The
State Bar of California recently acknowledged as part of a study of the bar exam
that “the definition of minimum competence is inherently non-quantitative.”108
Moreover, the competence measured by bar exams—substantive legal knowledge and the ability to rapidly identify legal issues on a closed-book exam—
relates only tangentially to the lawyer’s duty of competence, which requires
“adequate preparation” and “inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of [a client’s] problem.”109 Indeed, in practice, lawyers can establish
the requisite competence to handle a matter through “necessary study” and

101. Hansen, supra note 2, at 1201 (citation omitted).
102. See id. at 1201–02.
103. NCBE, supra note 25, at 3.
104. See Rozema, supra note 76, at 819 (“One way a bar passage requirement could protect the public is by
preventing some law school graduates who are more prone to misconduct from practicing law.”).
105. See Hansen, supra note 2, at 1201–02; Rozema, supra note 76, at 819.
106. See, e.g., Jones v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 737 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1984); Osborne v. Texas, No. A-13CV-528-LY, 2013 WL 5556210, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2013) (“[R]equiring candidates to pass the bar exam
prior to admitting them to practice law is rationally related to the state’s legitimate goal of assuring a competent
bar.”).
107. Professor Abel has observed that the rules for the bar exam are “regurgitated and quickly forgotten.”
ABEL, supra note 2, at 214. For an argument that experienced lawyers should be made to sit for bar exams, see
David Adam Friedman, Do We Need a Bar Exam . . . For Experienced Lawyers?, 12 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022).
108. ST. BAR CAL., FINAL REPORT ON THE CALIFORNIA BAR EXAM STANDARD STUDY 43 (2017), https://
www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/communications/CA-State-Bar-Bar-Exam09122017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UA86-XH7F].
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (2018) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; see also Trujillo,
supra note 12, at 80 (“[T]he bar exam does nothing to address current problems with incompetence in the legal
profession.”).
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association with a lawyer of “established competence.”110 To encourage greater
competence among the practicing bar, jurisdictions should focus less on lawyers’
general legal knowledge at the beginning of their careers and more on lawyers
keeping up to date with changes in the law and not dabbling outside of their core
fields.111
To the extent that the bar exam does ensure some base level of “minimal competence,” its function is largely duplicative of the legal education requirement.
Numerous empirical studies have documented the strong correlation between law
school grades and performance on bar exams.112 The correlation is even stronger
after scaling grade point averages to adjust for law school selectivity. Using this
method, a New York State study of bar exam performance found that law school
grades have a 68% correlation with performance on the bar exam.113 There is also
a nearly perfect relationship between a law school class’ mean bar exam scaled
score and its mean LSAT score.114 Consequently, as the NCBE itself has conceded, bar exams convey little about candidates’ “competence” that has not already been conveyed by the time they sit for exams.115 The Fourth Circuit opined
on this point in a decision that ultimately upheld states’ use of bar exams:
If the only demonstration of [the bar exam’s relationship to legal practice] is
that it has a positive relationship to training course performance–e.g., law
school–then why does not training school performance itself demonstrate that
the applicant is fit to practice his profession? It is certainly clear that nothing
correlates better with training school performance than training school performance itself. An applicant for the Bar who has graduated from an accredited
law school arguably may be said to stand before the Examiners armed with

110. MODEL RULES R. 1.1 cmt. 2.
111. See Friedman, supra note 107, at 20–21.
112. See, e.g., Amy N. Farley, Christopher M. Swoboda, Joel Chanvisanuruk, Keanen M, McKinley, Alicia
Boards & Courtney Gilday, A Deeper Look at Bar Success: The Relationship Between Law Student Success,
Academic Performance, and Student Characteristics, 16 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 605, 622 (2019); Katherine A.
Austin, Catherine Martin Christopher & Darby Dickerson, Will I Pass the Bar Exam: Predicting Student
Success Using LSAT Scores and Law School Performance, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 753, 758 (2017) (“Published
studies unanimously find that the strongest indicator of a law school graduate’s success on the bar exam-even
more than LSAT score-is cumulative performance in law school.”); Wightman, supra note 1, at 35 (noting that
both adjusted and unadjusted law school GPA are predictive of bar passage).
113. MICHAEL KANE, ANDREW MROCH, DOUGLAS RIPKEY & SUSAN CASE, IMPACT OF THE INCREASE IN THE
PASSING SCORE ON THE NEW YORK BAR EXAM 126 (2006), https://www.nybarexam.org/press/ncberep.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W9TK-J63A]. This correlation is almost as strong as the correlation between different
sections of the bar exam. See id. at 73.
114. Rosin, supra note 27, at 74–75 (A candidate’s performance on the LSAT also moderately correlates
with bar exam performance); Austin et al., supra note 112, at 757.
115. “[T]here is no question that UGPAs, LSAT scores, law school grades, and MPRE scores are each helpful in identifying students at risk for failing the bar exam.” Susan M. Case, The Testing Column: Identifying
and Helping At-Risk Students, 80 BAR EXAMINER 30, 31 (2011). Using law school grades as a predictor of bar
exam performance, researchers were able to identify seventy-eight percent of the students who would fail the
bar exam at the University of Cincinnati College of Law on their first attempts. See Farley et al., supra note
112, at 624.
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law school grades demonstrating that he possesses sufficient job-related skills.
Why, then, any bar exam at all?116

The bar exams’ public protection rationale also ignores that aspiring lawyers
may take the exams more than once.117 Defenders of bar exams occasionally use
low pass rates on specific exam administrations as evidence that bar exams are
effective screening tools but overlook high overall pass rates.118 Among 2017
graduates of ABA-accredited law schools, nearly ninety percent passed a bar
exam within two years of graduation.119 The true overall pass rate of the class of
2017 is likely higher because some candidates undoubtedly passed subsequently.120 An earlier study of over 23,000 graduates of ABA-accredited law
schools estimated the overall pass rate to be ninety-five percent.121
Only a few jurisdictions place limits on bar exam attempts, meaning that candidates’ persistence and resources are often as important as their “competence.”
Bar preparation is incredibly costly.122 All things being equal, individuals from
lower socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to become never-passers even
though their first-time pass rates are equivalent to those of more privileged
peers.123 Oft-observed racial differences in pass rates can partly be explicated by
the lower likelihood that minority candidates will sit for bar exams more than
once.124 Having to work or take care of dependents reduces one’s odds of passing
the bar exam as well.125
Finally, lack of competence is not a major cause of attorney misconduct.
Professor Levin’s study of Connecticut’s disciplinary system found that four percent of cases pertain to competence.126 The most common violations involved

116. Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 752 (4th Cir. 1976).
117. Most jurisdictions do not limit attempts. See generally Kinsler, supra note 35, at 900–01 (noting that
thirty-two states have no limits and only seven have hard limits).
118. See Mark Hansen, Bar Fight, 101 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 48, 48–49 (2016) (noting organized bar’s concerns
about falling bar passage pass rates).
119. See Press Release, ABA, ABA Section of Legal Education releases comprehensive report on bar passage data (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2020/02/abasection-of-legal-education-releases-comprehensive-report-on-/ [https://perma.cc/7CAD-NE2T].
120. In California, eighteen percent of applicants pass on their fourth attempts or later. See Yakowitz, supra
note 1, at 12 (citation omitted).
121. See Wightman, supra note 1, at viii.
122. A committee of the Iowa Bar estimated the total cost from graduation to admission to the bar to be
$29,000. See Grant Rodgers, Justices Ask: Eliminate Bar Exam?, DES MOINES REG. (Aug. 27, 2014), https://
www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2014/08/28/bar-exam-hearing/14717163/ [https://perma.cc/5LF8DY5F].
123. Yakowitz, supra note 1, at 24.
124. See Wightman, supra note 1, at 56 (reporting that approximately two percent of white examinees failed
their first attempt at the bar and did not attempt it again compared to five percent of Hispanic and nearly eleven
percent of Black examinees).
125. Aaron N. Taylor, Jason M. Scott & Joshua Jackson, It’s Not Where You Start, It’s How You Finish:
Predicting Law School and Bar Success, ACCESSLEX INST. RES. PAPER NO. 21-03 at 21 (Apr. 21, 2021), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3827402 [https://perma.cc/X54H-VEUM].
126. Levin et al., supra note 35, at 14.

178

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 35:163

communication, diligence, safekeeping of client property, fees, and conflicts of
interest.127 If the goal of licensing is to screen out potential ethical violators and
not merely assure an amorphous sense of “minimal competence,” the MPRE,
designed to “measure examinees’ knowledge and understanding of established
standards related to the professional conduct of lawyers,”128 is presumably more
suited to the task. When jurisdictions introduced written bar exams, there were no
common ethical standards on which to test attorneys, and jurisdictions began to
administer the MPRE only in 1980.129
Of course, bar exams probably do screen out some unqualified individuals who
gain admission to, and graduate from, ABA-accredited law schools. Although
discipline rates are underinclusive of attorney misconduct,130 several studies have
noted a relationship between the bar exam and attorney discipline. For example,
Professor Kinsler has shown that Tennessee lawyers who passed bar exams on
their second attempts are twice as likely to be disciplined than attorneys who
passed on their first attempts.131 Professor Levin similarly reports higher rates of
discipline among Connecticut attorneys who failed on their first attempts.132
Lastly, in a recent study of California attorneys, Professors Anderson and Muller
use law school admissions data to assess the relationship between bar exam
scores and attorney discipline and contend that lowering California’s minimum
pass score would lead to an increase in misconduct.133
Although these studies demonstrate a link between the bar exam and attorney
discipline and provide the only real evidence that bar exams protect the public,
their findings are limited in two key respects. First, candidates who never pass bar
exams are different from candidates who pass on subsequent attempts; in particular, they are more likely to be racial minorities and of lower socioeconomic status.134 It cannot be assumed that law school graduates who never become
attorneys—perhaps because they cannot afford to take bar exams more than once
or to take time off work to study—would commit misconduct at the same rates as
their peers who do have the time and resources and pass on later attempts.
Second, none of the preceding studies show that bar exams have an independent
127. Id.
128. Anderson IV & Muller, supra note 36, at 320 (citation omitted).
129. See Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing the Origins of the
MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1299 (2003); see also Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the
Legalization of American Legal Ethics -II: The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 217–18 (2002)
(describing the development of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility).
130. As Professor Martyn observed thirty years ago, “[l]awyer self-regulation misleads the public to the
extent that it purports to be a sufficient guarantor of lawyer competence. Client complaints received by bar
grievance committees are sifted through the profession’s moral screen.” Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence
and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar, 69 GEO. L.J. 705, 713 (1981); see also Levin, infra note 162, at 4–6
(noting improvement in disciplinary systems but extensive use of non-public sanctions).
131. See Kinsler, supra note 35, at 897.
132. Levin et al., supra note 35, at 21.
133. See Anderson IV & Muller, supra note 36, at 314–15.
134. See Yakowitz, supra note 1, at 23–24.

2022]

PROTECTING THE GUILD OR PROTECTING THE PUBLIC?

179

effect on attorney discipline. This qualification is crucial because performance on
the bar exam is correlated with a whole host of factors, including entering credentials, law school grades, and MPRE score.135 The bar exam may appear to affect
discipline when it is in fact these other factors that drive differences in misconduct rates.
Anderson and Muller are careful to note in their study of California lawyers
that the bar exam’s effect on attorney misconduct may not be causal.136 Because
of limitations in their dataset, they also estimated bar exam scores via the law
schools that lawyers attended.137 The Levin study of Connecticut lawyers conversely accessed lawyers’ grades, law schools, LSAT scores, and bar passage history and found that only grades and rank of law school had independent effects
on discipline rates.138 In other words, performance on bar exams is predictive of
bar passage because it is correlated with factors that lead to differences in
employment outcomes.139 Levin and her co-authors write:
Law graduates who do well in law school and graduate from top tier schools
are more likely to go to large firms; lawyers who graduate from lower tier
schools are more likely to work in solo and small firm practice. Solo and small
firm lawyers are more likely to be disciplined, and lawyers in such settings are
often disciplined for relatively low-level acts of omission (e.g., neglect of client matters, failure to return phone calls) that may be due to inadequate office
support.140

Practice area may potentially play a role as well; graduates of lower-ranked
schools tend to work in smaller firms but also in fields such as family law and
criminal law that draw the most disciplinary complaints.141 In Texas, for example,
135. For entering credentials and law school grades, see Kane et al., supra note 113. For the correlation
between MPRE and MBE scores, see Case, supra note 115, at 31 (identifying a 0.58 correlation).
136. See Anderson IV & Muller, supra note 36, at 320.
137. To find a link between bar exam performance and misconduct, the authors used California law schools’
LSAT scores as proxies for their graduates’ bar exam scores. See id. at 313–14.
138. See Levin et al., supra note 35, at 26.
139. Anderson IV and Muller consider this point although their dataset did not allow them to test it. See
Anderson IV & Muller, supra note 36, at 320-21. See also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Two Hemispheres of
Legal Education and the Rise and Fall of Local Law Schools, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 863, 878 (2006) (“By the
measures of practice setting and income, graduates of local law schools are entering a different sphere of the
profession from graduates of elite schools.”); Deborah J. Merritt, Bar Exam Scores and Lawyer Discipline,
LAW SCH. CAFE (June 3, 2017), https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2017/06/03/bar-exam-scores-and-lawyerdiscipline/ [https://perma.cc/4KES-YAWM] (noting that over ninety percent of discipline is against solo and
small firm practitioners).
140. Levin et al., supra note 35, at 39.
141. See generally Kyle Rozema, Lawyer Misconduct in America 14 (Jan. 2, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/lawandeconomics/workshops/Documents/Paper%
202.%20Kyle%20Rozema.Lawyer%20Misconduct%20in%20America.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7SW-4PL8]
[hereinafter Lawyer Misconduct] (reporting that attorneys who work in family law, bankruptcy, criminal
law, and tort law have a misconduct rate that is six times that of other attorneys); see also Jonakait, supra
note 139, at 904 (suggesting that graduates from lower-ranked law schools will predominately focus on
matters involving personal plight).
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half of disciplinary complaints in 2018-2019 involved criminal law, family law,
and personal injury.142
A new study by Professor Rozema provides the first proof that bar exams might
directly affect discipline rates. The Rozema study examines public discipline in four
small states in the years before and after their decisions to eliminate the diploma
privilege.143 He finds that the overall sanction rate would have risen from 3.9 percent
to 5.1 percent in the jurisdictions within twenty-five years if they had not instituted
bar exams.144 Rozema takes no position on whether this minor effect on discipline
justifies restricting the supply of attorneys via the bar exam requirement.145 But even
if a small reduction in sanction rates justifies the maintenance of bar exams, the
states in question instituted other changes to their admissions procedures at the same
time that they eliminated the privilege: all four states adopted the MPRE, and one of
the states also tightened its character and fitness process.146
Rozema acknowledges that his study captures the “effects of the package of
licensing changes” and not those of the bar exam specifically.147 But these other
changes may be more consequential than the bar exam. Indeed, Rozema observes
that differences in misconduct rates between attorneys who took bar exams and
attorneys who did not emerged after twenty-three years of practice.148 If the bar
exam were to have a causal role, then its effect should manifest closer to the time
that lawyers sat for their exams. Another, larger study conducted by Rozema
points to the central role of the MPRE in deterring attorney misconduct; he estimates that jurisdictions’ adoption of the MPRE lowered misconduct rates by
twenty percent.149 Even if this figure overestimates the MPRE’s impact somewhat, it should not be surprising that ethical misconduct dropped after jurisdictions began to test attorneys on their ethical responsibilities.
In the next Part, I focus on the effects of Wisconsin’s diploma privilege. As set
out below, in Wisconsin, graduates of the two in-state law schools do not have to
sit for the state’s bar exam whereas graduates of other law schools do.150 If bar

142. ST. BAR TEX., ANNUAL REPORT 2018–2019 at 20 (2019), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.
cfm?Section=Annual_Reports&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=55296 [https://perma.cc/
GQM5-C445].
143. Rozema, supra note 76, at 802.
144. See id. at 828.
145. See generally id. at 804.
146. See id. at 804.
147. Id. at 812.
148. Id. at 816.
149. Lawyer Misconduct, supra note 141, at 4; see also Frank Fagan, Reducing Ethical Misconduct of
Attorneys with Mandatory Ethics Training: A Dynamic Panel Approach, 15 REV. L. & ECON. 10 (2019),
https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2017-0049 [https://perma.cc/4J3H-D5PY] (“[M]andatory continuing legal
education in ethics is negatively and significantly linked with charges filed against attorneys for ethical
misconduct . . . .”).
150. Wisconsin also does not use the MPRE although some candidates likely take the test to gain admission
in other states. See Wisconsin, NAT’L CONF. BAR EXAM’RS, https://www.ncbex.org/jurisdiction-information/
jurisdiction/wi [https://perma.cc/2CZV-EDRL] (last visited Jan. 1, 2022).
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exams protect the public by screening out attorneys who are likely to engage in
misconduct, as some commentators have alleged, one would expect to see either
higher rates of complaints or charges against Wisconsin attorneys, most of whom
did not sit for bar exams. I then separately explore differences in discipline rates
among Wisconsin attorneys based on whether they gained admission via the
diploma privilege or via bar exams.

III. DISCIPLINARY DATA
In this Part, I draw on two distinct sources of information: state-level complaint
and charge data from the annual Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems (SOLD),
and Wisconsin disciplinary decisions involving attorneys who were admitted via
the diploma privilege versus bar exams. I find no evidence that the bar exam has a
direct effect on misconduct using these measures.
A. CROSS-STATE DISCIPLINARY DATA

In every state, attorneys are subject to discipline when they commit misconduct.151 Although procedures differ, a client or colleague usually initiates the disciplinary process by filing a complaint with the state’s disciplinary agency.152
Disciplinary counsel review and investigate complaints and bring charges against
attorneys when probable cause exists to believe that they have violated their
ethical obligations.153 Lawyers face a range of potential sanctions from private
reprimands to public censure, suspension, and disbarment.154 Although some
commentators have castigated attorney discipline as too protective of attorneys,155 most jurisdictions have professionalized disciplinary systems and subject
them to significant oversight.156
To compare Wisconsin to other states, I rely on the annual SOLD conducted
by the ABA’s Center for Professional Responsibility. SOLD collects information
from disciplinary authorities regarding complaints filed, number of lawyers

151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWS § 5 (2000).
152. See id.
153. See, e.g., Debra Moss Curtis & Billie Jo Kaufman, A Public View of Attorney Discipline in Florida:
Statistics, Commentary, and Analysis of Disciplinary Actions Against Licensed Attorneys in the State of
Florida from 1988-2002, 28 NOVA L. REV. 669, 681–82 (2004); Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G. T. Wolf,
The Paradox and Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 300 (2012).
154. See Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of the Indigent
Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1184 (1988) (“Available sanctions typically include a letter of caution, private reprimand, public censure, suspension, or disbarment.”).
155. See, e.g., Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 958,
980 (1991); Judith Kilpatrick, Regulating the Litigation Immunity: New Power and a Breath of Fresh Air for
the Attorney Discipline System, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1069, 1097 (1992).
156. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1166–67 (2009) (“[S]tates
[have begun] to treat the discipline of lawyers as a significant enterprise. State supreme courts took control of
the disciplinary process in almost all of the states. Enforcement resources increased. Disciplinary prosecution
offices were reorganized and bolstered.”).
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charged, as well as sanctions levied. I use both the number of complaints and lawyers charged from 2015 through 2017 as proxies for attorney misconduct.157
I use complaints and charges instead of sanctions for two main reasons. First,
even the most professional and determined regulator can investigate and successfully prosecute only a fraction of cases of alleged attorney misconduct.158 Thus,
public sanctions are a poor proxy for misconduct, and most empirical studies of
professional misconduct focus on complaints for this reason.159 Considering
charges in addition to complaints also takes into account that some complaints
filed against attorneys may be frivolous and not offer any evidence of misconduct.160 The second reason is jurisdictions vary in their disciplinary procedures
and the penalties they impose. For example, some states issue private reprimands
and place attorneys on probation whereas others do not.161 A few jurisdictions
also have diversion programs when the misconduct at issue is on account of substance abuse.162 Attorneys who participate in these programs are typically not disciplined, potentially skewing discipline rates.
Of course, neither complaints nor charges filed are perfect measures of attorney
misconduct. Because of information asymmetries between attorneys and clients,
many clients are unaware when their attorneys commit misconduct.163 The process of filing a complaint against an attorney differs by the jurisdiction, and clients and lawyers may vary in their knowledge and trust of formal disciplinary
mechanisms. Disciplinary authorities too may differ in their inclinations to investigate complaints and pursue formal charges.164 Nevertheless, if the bar exam
157. Focusing on a three-year period accounts for possibility of randomness in a given year.
158. See also Rozema, supra note 76, at 806 (observing that eighty-seven percent of disciplinary complaints
are dismissed prior to a hearing).
159. Lawyer Misconduct, supra note 141, at 1. It should be noted that while complaints and sanctions are
better proxies for misconduct than sanctions, in many situations, clients will be unaware that they are injured.
See generally Susan Saab Fortney, A Tort in Search of a Remedy: Prying Open the Courthouse Doors for Legal
Malpractice Victims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033, 2036 (2017) (“Due to the nature of the attorney-client relationship . . . injured persons may be completely unaware that the attorney has engaged in misconduct. From the
outset of the representation, most inexperienced users of legal services largely lack information to judge their
lawyers’ conduct.”).
160. Even accounts critical of attorney discipline acknowledge that most complaints are meritless. See
David O. Weber, Still in Good Standing - The Crisis in Attorney Discipline, 73 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 58, 61–62
(1987) (noting that most complaints are “unjustified” or “fall into the category of my lawyer was rude to me”).
161. Florida and Illinois are among the states that do not issue private sanctions. See AM. BAR ASS’N,
SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 2018 at 17, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/2018sold-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK25-YM4P] (last visited
Feb. 3, 2022). Texas and Virginia are among the states that do not provide for probation. Id. at 24.
162. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1998) [hereinafter Emperor’s Clothes] (describing
growth of nonpunitive diversion programs); see also Matthew J. Madalo, Ethics Year in Review, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1291 (2002) (ascribing lower costs to California’s attorney diversion program in comparison to
prosecution and punishment).
163. Fortney, supra note 159, at 2036.
164. See Anderson IV & Muller, supra note 36, at 321 (“Cross- state comparisons may have little value due
to disparities in state bar disciplinary procedures, enforcement, and priorities.”).
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does protect the public by screening out attorneys who are likely to commit misconduct, we would expect to see more complaints and charges against Wisconsin
attorneys than attorneys in other jurisdictions.165
Table 1 sets out the total number of complaints filed in the jurisdictions that
participated in SOLD from 2015–2017. I excluded jurisdictions that did not provide information for all three of these years. The complaint rate reflects the average number of yearly complaints per hundred attorneys.
Table 1: Complaints by State
State

Total Complaints
(2015–2017)

Yearly Complaint Rate
(per 100 attorneys)

3,669

8.9

586

6.3

Arizona

9,917

17.8

Arkansas

1,998

7.3

Colorado

10,531

13.3

Delaware

478

4.2

Florida

18,200

7.0

Georgia

8,315

7.2

Hawai’i

941

6.5

Idaho

1,040

6.8

Illinois

16,248

7.2

Indiana

4,637

8.3

Iowa

2,771

9.6

Kansas

2,191

6.5

Kentucky

3,414

6.2

Alabama
Alaska

165. Notwithstanding the limitations of the SOLD dataset, some empirical work has regressed the effects of
bar exam difficulty on complaint rates and other measures of misconduct. Michael B. Frisby, Sam C. Erman &
Victor D. Quintanilla, Safeguard or Barrier: An Empirical Examination of Bar Exam Cut Scores 40 (U.S.C.
Legal Stud. Working Paper, Paper NO. 21-17, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
3793272 [https://perma.cc/Q9WH-QTCM].
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Total Complaints
(2015–2017)

Yearly Complaint Rate
(per 100 attorneys)

8,651

13.0

683

4.3

Maryland

5,974

5.0

Michigan

6,351

5.1

Minnesota

3,535

4.4

Mississippi

1,462

5.4

Missouri

5,548

6.3

Nebraska

1,245

6.0

New Jersey

10,800

4.8

New Mexico

1,958

9.2

North Carolina

4,011

4.7

526

5.8

10,626

8.0

Oklahoma

3,806

7.1

Oregon

3,478

7.6

Pennsylvania

11,625

5.9

Rhode Island

1,019

6.4

Tennessee

3,842

5.7

Texas

22,959

7.7

Utah

2,443

8.7

Vermont

496

6.1

Virginia

9,812

10.4

Washington

6,342

6.7

Louisiana
Maine

North Dakota
Ohio
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Total Complaints
(2015–2017)

Yearly Complaint Rate
(per 100 attorneys)

West Virginia

1,781

8.7

Wisconsin

5,605

7.4

Wyoming

441

5.1

Average

7.3

As Table 1 shows, complaint rates vary considerably across the United States.
Arizona has the highest yearly complaint rate (17.8) and Delaware the lowest
(4.2). Wisconsin’s complaint rate (7.4) is nearly identical to the jurisdictional average (7.3) despite its maintenance of the diploma privilege.
The SOLD data also provides some evidence that there is no general relationship between complaint rates and jurisdictions’ attorney admissions policies.
Wisconsin offers the diploma privilege and has an average complaint rate.
Delaware and Louisiana require all attorneys, regardless of experience, to pass
bar exams,166 but the former state has the lowest complaint rate and the latter the
highest. Nor is there an apparent relationship between bar exam difficulty and
misconduct. Colorado and Oregon have high minimum bar exam pass scores but
above-average complaint rates whereas Minnesota and North Dakota have low
pass scores and below-average complaint rates.167 Figure 1 illustrates differences
in complaint rates using a heat map, with darker colors indicating higher rates of
complaints.

166. Over forty jurisdictions offer some admission by motion, which is generally available to attorneys who
have been practicing for five or more years. See Abigail L. DeBlasis, Another Tile in the “Jurisdictional
Mosaic” of Lawyer Regulation: Modifying Admission by Motion Rules to Meet the Needs of the 21st Century
Lawyer, 38 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 205, 214–15 (2018). For a complete list of jurisdictions and their stances on
admission upon motion, see NCBE, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS, https://
reports.ncbex.org/comp-guide/charts/chart-15/ [https://perma.cc/BSB5-2PGE] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
167. See Minimum Passing UBE Score by Jurisdiction, NCBE, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/ube/scoreportability/minimum-scores/ [https://perma.cc/ZE7D-ZK6T] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
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FIGURE 1: Differences in Complaint Rates

SOLD also collects information on the number of lawyers charged by jurisdiction. Table 2 sets out the total charges per state from 2015 through 2017 and the
yearly charge rate per hundred attorneys over this time period.
Table 2: Charges by State
State

Total Charges
(2015–2017)

Yearly Charge Rate
(per 100 attorneys)

201

0.49

Alaska

17

0.18

Arizona

256

0.46

Arkansas

146

0.53

Colorado

153

0.19

Delaware

44

0.39

Florida

846

0.33

Georgia

349

0.30

Hawai’i

31

0.21

Alabama
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State

Total Charges
(2015–2017)

Yearly Charge Rate
(per 100 attorneys)

Idaho

107

0.70

Indiana

142

0.26

Iowa

42

0.15

Kansas

81

0.24

Kentucky

157

0.28

Louisiana

386

0.58

74

0.46

Maryland

255

0.21

Michigan

372

0.30

Minnesota

105

0.13

Mississippi

64

0.23

Missouri

128

0.15

Nebraska

109

0.52

New Jersey

612

0.27

New Mexico

67

0.32

North Carolina

174

0.20

North Dakota

16

0.18

220

0.17

54

0.10

Oregon

235

0.52

Pennsylvania

642

0.33

Rhode Island

42

0.26

407

0.61

Maine

Ohio
Oklahoma

Tennessee
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State

Total Charges
(2015–2017)

Yearly Charge Rate
(per 100 attorneys)

Utah

91

0.32

Vermont

30

0.37

252

0.27

47

0.23

Wisconsin

118

0.16

Wyoming

13

0.15

Washington
West Virginia

Average

0.31

As Table 2 reflects, disciplinary authorities charge few attorneys per year. The
average charge rate per 100 attorneys across jurisdictions is 0.31. Wisconsin’s
charge rate per 100 attorneys is a mere 0.16. Only five of the thirty-eight jurisdictions in the dataset have lower charge rates.
Table 2 also does not suggest a particular relationship between bar difficulty
and attorney charge rates. The state with the highest charge rate (Idaho) requires
a high minimum score for bar passage; the state with the lowest charge rate
(Oklahoma) has a low minimum bar passage score.168 Differences in jurisdictional charge rates are illustrated in figure 2, with darker colors indicating higher
charge rates.

168. See id.
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FIGURE 2: Differences in Charge Rates

Thus, neither complaint nor charge data support the notion that bar exams curb
attorney misconduct. Wisconsin is an average jurisdiction in terms of complaints
filed against attorneys and better-than-average in terms of the number of attorneys charged with misconduct.
I do not claim that these comparisons prove that bar exams have no role in public protection. As noted, a variety of factors, some endogenous to disciplinary
systems themselves, could affect complaint and charge rates. It is also conceivable that Wisconsin’s complaint and charge rates would be even lower if it
required all attorneys to pass bar exams. However, the absence of cross-state data
that bar exams reduce complaints and discipline suggests that other factors are far
more impactful. Further research—with full access to the disciplinary data—
could identify these factors.
To examine the effects of bar exams on discipline more directly, the next section uses a separate dataset to compare the discipline rates of Wisconsin attorneys
who gained admission via the diploma privilege by attending either in-state law
school versus those who gained admission via bar exams. If bar exams protect the
public, then attorneys who qualified via the diploma privilege should be overrepresented in public discipline.
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B. WISCONSIN DISCIPLINARY DECISIONS

The Wisconsin Court System’s Office of Lawyer Regulation maintains a database of disciplinary decisions that is accessible to the public.169 I reviewed all
public disciplinary decisions from 2005 to 2019 and cross-referenced these decisions with the disciplined attorneys’ registrations from the Wisconsin State Bar
website. Between these sources, I was able to create a dataset of disciplined attorneys that included their admission dates, law school graduation dates, law school
alma maters, misconduct committed, sanctions imposed, and the counties in
which they currently practice. Out-of-state attorneys were identified by their
states of practice. I excluded attorneys whose registration information could not
be located.
There were 666 disciplinary decisions in the final dataset, the vast majority of
which involved in-state attorneys (81.4%). Especially notable in the dataset was
the preponderance of male attorneys (84.1%) and repeat offenders (17%). The average attorney was admitted to practice in 1988 and had been practicing for over
23.5 years at the time that he was disciplined, providing further evidence that
public discipline tends to be focused on older, more experienced attorneys.170 As
expected, few disciplinary decisions involved violations of competence (12.9%),
with most of these decisions also addressing other violations.
Wisconsin attorneys admitted via the diploma privilege should have higher discipline rates than attorneys admitted via bar exams if bar exams protect the public. Since the percentage of active Wisconsin attorneys who qualified via the
diploma privilege by attending either Marquette or Wisconsin Law Schools is
62.9%, one would expect to see a significantly higher percentage of diploma privilege attorneys among the disciplined attorney group.
Table 3 sets out the number of disciplinary cases involving attorneys admitted
via the diploma privilege and attorneys who were admitted via bar exams. For the
disciplined attorney group, I included results both with and without out-of-state
attorneys. Although the disciplined attorneys currently practicing out-of-state
may have been based in Wisconsin at the time that they were disciplined, their
inclusion within the disciplined attorney group might undermine the comparison
with the bar’s current membership.

169. See Lawyer Status and History, WISCONSIN COURT SYSTEM, https://lawyerhistory.wicourts.gov/
[https://perma.cc/P8EP-A2EL] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
170. See, e.g., Rozema, supra note 76, at 20; Anderson IV & Muller, supra note 36, at 314; see also Patricia
W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An Empirical Study, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 785, 833–34 (2004) (describing as “counterintuitive” the notion that older attorneys would have more discipline problems).
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Table 3: Wisconsin Discipline and the Diploma Privilege
In- State
Attorneys
Diploma
Privilege
Cohort
Total
Percent

Disciplinary Cases
(2005–2019)

Disciplinary Cases
(excl. out-of-state)

8028

413

347

12,757

666

542

62.9

62.0

64.0

As Table 3 indicates, attorneys who qualified via the diploma privilege compose 62.9% of the active, in-state bar membership and are responsible for 62% of
disciplinary cases. I used a chi-square test to measure the difference between
these values. The chi-square test is a statistical technique commonly used to compare expected to actual values in categorical data.171 This analysis reveals that the
representation of diploma privilege attorneys among the general bar membership
is not significantly different than their representation in the disciplined attorney
group (p > 0.1). Excluding the cases involving out-of-state attorneys does not
change the results (p > 0.1). Thus, it appears that attorneys admitted via the
diploma privilege commit misconduct at the same rate as attorneys who qualify
via bar exams. Because the diploma privilege cohort is not overrepresented in
Wisconsin disciplinary cases, I find no evidence that the bar exam affects attorney
misconduct.
Previous research has suggested that factors such as experience, gender, and
practice setting can affect misconduct rates.172 To assess whether differences
between the diploma privilege and bar exam cohorts are confounding the bar
exam’s effects, I compared the backgrounds of a random sample of fifty
Wisconsin attorneys who qualified via the diploma privilege to a random sample
of Wisconsin attorneys who qualified via bar exams.
This comparison did not reveal any notable differences between the two
cohorts. The diploma privilege cohort has slightly less practice experience (median law school graduation year of 1998.5 versus 1996) but has a higher representation of men (60% compared to 54%). Private practitioners make up most of
each sample (74% of the diploma privilege cohort and 72% of the bar exam
cohort). Few attorneys in either group worked for large law firms (18% for the
diploma privilege cohort and 10% for the bar exam cohort). Therefore, differences between the two groups are unlikely to account for the similarity in discipline
171. Hatamyar & Simmons, supra note 170, at 799.
172. See generally Lawyer Misconduct, supra note 141, at 6 (noting “old age, incorporated law practice,
male, law practice in rural areas, solo and small law practice, and trust account authority” have been found to
correlate with misconduct in the empirical literature).
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rates. Future research, with full access to Wisconsin lawyer information and disciplinary data, would be able to identify the main drivers of discipline.
One obvious limitation to the above analysis is that it is focused only on
Wisconsin. Wisconsin is not a UBE state and maintains a low bar exam pass
score.173 Wisconsin also has a close-knit legal market that is dominated by small
firms: 92% of Wisconsin law firms consists of five or fewer lawyers, and the majority of these are solo firms.174 Most important of all, Wisconsin’s law schools
are held in high regard by the state’s lawyers.175 As Professor Moran has
observed, this last factor may explain why the privilege has survived in
Wisconsin but not in other states.176
It is conceivable that, consistent with the empirical research analyzed in Part
II, states with a greater number of law schools and more stratified legal markets
would see an increase in misconduct were they to adopt the diploma privilege.
However, many states are analogous to Wisconsin in that they have relatively
small legal markets and one or two in-state law schools. As set out below, larger
states may also choose to limit the privilege to only graduates of certain law
schools.

IV. A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE?
Historically, most states extended the diploma privilege to graduates of in-state
law schools without mandating completion of a specific course of study.177 This
Part examines how the diploma privilege should be adapted to the modern era
while addressing the worry that law schools cannot be trusted to graduate only
qualified attorneys.
A. RECONSTITUTING THE DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE

Having shown that the diploma privilege has not caused higher discipline rates
in Wisconsin, I next turn to the question of design. One commentator has
described Wisconsin’s privilege as “the most restrictive diploma privilege statute
ever written,”178 but its actual requirements are minimal; the rule does not even

173. See Wisconsin Jurisdiction Information, NCBE, https://www.ncbex.org/jurisdiction-information/
jurisdiction/wi [https://perma.cc/6T4N-VUUS] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
174. See ST. BAR WIS., MEMBER STATISTICS, https://www.wisbar.org/aboutus/overview/pages/memberstatistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/QX3Q-CEQE] (last visited Feb. 4, 2022).
175. See Moran, supra note 11 at 655; see also Stack Jr., supra note 54, at 123 (noting that the maintenance
of the diploma privilege in Wisconsin “voice[s] confidence in the state’s two law schools”).
176. See Moran, supra note 11, at 655; see also Derek T. Muller, Do State Bar Licensing Authorities
Distrust Law Schools?, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY (July 22, 2019), https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2019/7/
do-state-bar-licensing-authorities-distrust-law-schools [https://perma.cc/86GY-LDFT] (suggesting that
jurisdictions that resemble Wisconsin and have a “community of trust” between the bar and in-state law
schools should consider the diploma privilege).
177. See Goldman, supra note 10, at 40, 42.
178. Id. at 42.
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require study of Wisconsin law.179 Wisconsin’s statute reads in full:
An applicant who has been awarded a first professional degree in law from a
law school in this state that is fully, not provisionally, approved by the
American bar association shall satisfy the legal competence requirement by
presenting to the clerk certification of the board showing:
(1) Satisfactory completion of legal studies leading to the first professional
degree in law. The law school shall certify to the board satisfactory completion
of not less than 84 semester credits earned by the applicant for purposes of the
degree awarded.
(2) Satisfactory completion of study in mandatory and elective subject matter
areas. The law school shall certify to the board satisfactory completion of not
less than 60 semester credits in the mandatory and elective subject matter areas
as provided in (a) and (b). All semester credits so certified shall have been
earned in regular law school courses having as their primary and direct purpose the study of rules and principles of substantive and procedural law as they
may arise in the courts and administrative agencies of the United States and
this state.
(a) Elective subject matter areas; 60-credit rule. Not less than 60 semester
credits shall have been earned in regular law school courses in the subject matter areas generally known as: Administrative law, appellate practice and procedure, commercial transactions, conflict of laws, constitutional law, contracts,
corporations, creditors’ rights, criminal law and procedure, damages, domestic
relations, equity, evidence, future interests, insurance, jurisdiction of courts,
legislation, labor law, ethics and legal responsibilities of the profession, partnership, personal property, pleading and practice, public utilities, quasicontracts, real property, taxation, torts, trade regulation, trusts, and wills and
estates. The 60-credit subject matter requirement may be satisfied by combinations of the curricular offerings in each approved law school in this state.
(b) Mandatory subject matter areas; 30-credit rule. Not less than 30 of the
60 semester credits shall have been earned in regular law school courses in
each of the following subject matter areas: constitutional law, contracts, criminal law and procedure, evidence, jurisdiction of courts, ethics, and legal
responsibilities of the legal profession, pleading and practice, real property,
torts, and wills and estates.
(c) Law school certification of subject matter content of curricular offerings.
Upon the request of the supreme court, the dean of each such law school shall
file with the clerk a certified statement setting forth the courses taught in the

179. None of the four states that have adopted an emergency diploma privilege have imposed curricular
requirements; they have also not specifically limited the privilege to in-state law schools. For a discussion of
the various emergency diploma privilege approaches, see Derek T. Muller, Disaggregating the Debate Over
the Bar Exam and Diploma Privilege, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY (July 10, 2020), https://excessofdemocracy.
com/blog/2020/7/disaggregating-the-debate-over-the-bar-exam-and-diploma-privilege [https://perma.cc/
ZBJ9-N33U].
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law school which satisfy the requirements for a first professional degree in
law, together with a statement of the percentage of time devoted in each course
to the subject matter of the areas of law specified in this rule.180

Since the mandatory and elective courses set out in the Wisconsin Rule are staples of law school curricula, most law school graduates would probably be able
to meet its requirements.181 But the privilege is only available to graduates of
Marquette and Wisconsin Law Schools.
The constitutionality of diploma privilege statutes focusing on in-state law
schools is unclear. Courts have dismissed challenges to diploma privilege statutes
and rules based on the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities clauses,182
but have been more sympathetic to challenges based on the Dormant Commerce
Clause.183 For example, in Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, a plaintiff sued to invalidate Wisconsin’s diploma privilege statute on the ground that it impermissibly
burdened interstate commerce.184 Wisconsin ultimately settled the suit. Yet,
Judge Posner’s Seventh Circuit opinion remanding the case evinced skepticism
that a state’s decision to extend the privilege only to in-state law schools could
satisfy rational basis review:
For suppose—a supposition not only consistent with but actually suggested by
the scanty record that the plaintiffs were not allowed to amplify—that
Wisconsin law is no greater part of the curriculum of the Marquette and
Madison law schools than it is of the law schools of Harvard, Yale, Columbia,
Virginia, the University of Texas, Notre Dame, the University of Chicago, the
University of Oklahoma, and the University of Northern Illinois . . . That
would suggest that the diploma privilege creates an arbitrary distinction
between graduates of the two Wisconsin law schools and graduates of other
accredited law schools. And it is a distinction that burdens interstate commerce. Law school applicants who intend to practice law in Wisconsin have an
incentive to attend one of the Wisconsin law schools even if, were it not for the
diploma privilege, they would much prefer to attend law school in another
state.185

180. WIS. CT. R. 40.03.
181. See also Moran, supra note 11, at 648-49 (“[T]he diploma privilege directly enforces what the bar
exam indirectly enforces: that students take certain courses.”).
182. See, e.g., Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 686 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (holding that Mississippi’s
diploma privilege does not burden the right to travel); Huffman v. Mont. Sup. Ct., 372 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (D.
Mont. 1974) aff’d mem., 419 U.S. 955 (1974) (holding that Montana’s diploma privilege did not infringe upon
any fundamental right and that graduates of out-of-state law schools are not a suspect class for purposes of
equal protection doctrine).
183. Two excellent student notes have explored this topic in depth. See Daniel B. Nora, Note, On
Wisconsin: The Viability of Diploma Privilege Regulations under Dormant Commerce Clause Review, 37 J.
COLL. & U.L. 447 (2011); Paul C. Huddle, Comment, Raising the Bar: How the Seventh Circuit Nearly Struck
Down the Diploma Privilege Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 38 (2009).
184. Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F. 3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009).
185. Id. at 704.
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Future caselaw may be even less favorable to states that seek to favor in-state
institutions.186
To avoid constitutional challenge, states could limit the privilege to public law
schools.187 States are generally permitted to favor their own institutions at the
expense of out-of-state competitors under the “market participant” exception to
the Dormant Commerce Clause.188 Judge Posner raised this possibility specifically in Wiesmueller.189 Fourteen states have public law schools and no private
law schools.190 However, this option is probably unrealistic for other states.191
Another possibility would be for states to expressly require the study of their
laws and procedures. A district court upheld Mississippi’s old diploma privilege
statute, reasoning that in-state graduates are more likely to know Mississippi law
and are more ready to practice in the state.192 Recent advocacy has also centered
on this option.193
Tying the diploma privilege to the study of state-specific laws and procedures
accords with the Constitution but would also potentially spur needed legal education reform. Currently, legal education is characterized by its homogeneity, with
the vast majority of law schools partaking in a “one size fits all” model.194 Some
degree of uniformity is undoubtedly desirable to ensure a baseline level of training for attorneys. But law schools may be failing to prepare graduates for the settings in which they are likely to practice.195

186. A group of legal education scholars has persuasively argued that Wisconsin’s diploma privilege statute
substantially burdens interstate commerce and – contrary Judge Posner’s position – should be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Angelos et al., supra note 10, at 181 (arguing for a higher standard of review than rational basis).
187. See Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 706–07; Angelos et al., supra note 10, at 179. The exception was ultimately not available in Wiesmueller because Marquette is a private law school. Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 707.
188. See Angelos et al., supra note 10, at 179; see also David S. Bogen, The Market Participant Doctrine
and the Clear Statement Rule, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543, 543 (2006) (“According to the market participant
doctrine, however, the state does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause by favoring its own citizens and
companies when it buys or sells goods or services.”).
189. Wiesmueller, 571 F.3d at 707.
190. Id.
191. See generally Angelos et al., supra note 10, at 179 (describing a privilege conferred only to public law
schools as “politically unpopular and perhaps unwise as a matter of policy”).
192. See Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 687 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (“[I]t is quite improbable that
courses offered at law schools outside the state provide the close correlation to Mississippi law and practice and
the state bar exam which the University of Mississippi’s curriculum possesses.”).
193. Angelos et al., supra note 10, at 168.
194. Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at A Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735,
769–70 (2011) (citation omitted).
195. Id. at 770. As Professor Barton observed some time ago:
Perhaps the most damning evidence of the efficacy of the bar exam, however, is a consideration of
the skills of the newest members of the bar. Query what legal tasks, if any, we could guarantee that
a lawyer could perform on the day she receives her letter of bar admittance. Without further training or experience, most would shudder to imagine this newly minted lawyer immediately trying a
case, or drafting a complex contract.
Barton, supra note 9, at 445.
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State laws and procedures govern the vast majority of transactions and legal
disputes.196 Largely due to bar exams, law schools focus on uniform codes and
principles of common law that may be inapplicable in the jurisdictions in which
they are located.197 The UBE tests the “law of nowhere” and jurisdictions that
have adopted it have seen interest in state law courses plummet.198 If the diploma
privilege were tied to curricula, law schools would no longer treat state laws and
procedures as afterthoughts. Even students who intend to specialize in fields that
are controlled by federal law would be better served if their foundational courses
covered the laws that are applicable in their jurisdiction as opposed to general
codes and principles.199
To survive constitutional scrutiny, a diploma privilege statute would also not
need to mandate that law schools interject state law into every course in order for
their graduates to qualify for the privilege.200 The most effective way to infuse
more state law into law school curricula would be to expand opportunities for law
students to represent members of their local communities.201 The bar exam has
historically been an obstacle to the expansion of experiential courses.202 New
Hampshire maintains a limited experiential pathway to licensure, and Oregon is
currently considering creating a two-year program that would serve as an

196. See Anna E. Carpenter, Jessica K. Steinberg, Colleen F. Shanahan & Alyx Mark, Studying the “New”
Civil Judges, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 249, 252 (2018) (“To ignore state civil courts is to ignore ninety-nine percent
of the cases in our civil justice system.”); see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Andrew P. Morriss & William D.
Henderson, Enduring Hierarchies in American Legal Education, 89 IND. L. J. 941, 945 (2014) (“Until the early
twentieth century, almost all law schools primarily focused on training lawyers for local markets . . . What
became the dominant twentieth-century law school model rejected most of these characteristics.”).
197. The UBE in particular “eliminates any and all state law content and tests only rules from uniform codes
and generally accepted principles of common law.” Griggs, supra note 6, at 2.
198. See N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N, supra note 18, at 30, 32 (citations omitted).
199. See Griggs, supra note 6, at 19; see also id. at 62 (“[T]he UBE incentivizes New York law schools to
alter their curricula to teach to the UBE, and it incentivizes students to study those principles that help them
pass the UBE. Concerns about actual law practice are more distant.”).
200. One commentator has suggested that merely offering some courses on state law and hiring professors
admitted in the jurisdiction may be sufficient to demonstrate sufficient locality under Wiesmueller. See
Wiesmueller v. Kosobucki, 571 F. 3d 699, 699 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Huddle, supra note 183, at 58.
201. Angelos et al., supra note 10, at 184:
Based on the numerous ways in which students in a state’s law schools acquire knowledge of and
skills connected to state-based practice, and the extent to which judges and practitioners in the state
become familiar with the students and the legal education offered by the state’s schools, in-state
schools have means of demonstrating a new lawyer’s competence to practice in that state that outof-state schools lack.
See Huddle, supra note 183, at 57 (noting that clinical and skills courses often require study of state law).
202. Students, rightly or wrongly, perceive that clinical courses are a distraction from courses that will be
tested on bar exams. The NCBE has fed into this notion by alleging that the increased popularity of clinical
courses partly explains falling bar passage numbers. See Robert R. Kuehn & David R. Moss, A Study of the
Relationship Between Law School Coursework and Bar Exam Outcomes, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 623, 625–26
(2019) (questioning this alleged correlation).
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alternative to the bar exam.203 The virtue of these programs is that they require
graduates to demonstrate that they can complete core legal tasks effectively
before they are permitted to provide legal services directly to the public.204
Jurisdictions could also require that candidates seeking to benefit from the
diploma privilege focus on subjects that are integral to their economies and legal
markets. For example, immigration is a major practice area in many states but
tends to feature low-quality representation.205 No law school in the country
requires the subject, and no jurisdictions test it on a bar exam. An attorney can
open an immigration practice upon passing the bar exam without having had any
exposure to immigration law.206 A state could require that candidates seeking to
benefit from the diploma privilege not only successfully complete courses that
are staples of present curricula but also courses such as immigration law that may
be regionally significant. Other subjects of regional importance include oil and
gas law, Native-American law, and admiralty. Jurisdictions with few large firms
may well wish to mandate a course in law practice management.207 The ABA qua
regulator could exercise its authority to ensure that law schools still cover core
subjects and do not overcorrect and become parochial.
Preparing lawyers for in-state practice may appear antiquated because of
increasing lawyer mobility. However, as an empirical matter, most law school
graduates practice primarily in the states in which their law schools are located.208
Moreover, while most law schools would feel compelled to offer curricula that
could satisfy the diploma privilege, some law schools may choose not to do so,
reasoning that their students are more interested in national or international
203. See OR. ST. BD. BAR EXAM’RS, RECOMMENDATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES TO THE BAR EXAM TASK
FORCE 7–11 (2021), https://taskforces.osbar.org/files/Bar-Exam-Alternatives-TFReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5TZ8-VYF6].
204. Id. at 9.
205. See Benjamin Edwards & Brian L. Frye, It’s Hard Out There For An Immigrant; Lemon Lawyers
Make It Harder, THE HILL (July 19, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/369702-its-hard-out-therefor-an-immigrant-lemon-lawyers-make-it-harder [https://perma.cc/B55K-YR9X] (summarizing empirical
research); see also Richard A. Posner & Albert H. Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (2011) (reporting from a survey of federal judges that the quality of
representation is lowest in immigration and family law cases).
206. Unsurprisingly, immigration lawyers often turn to formal and informal networks for guidance, including assistance with ethical issues. See generally Leslie C. Levin, Specialty Bars as a Site of Professionalism:
The Immigration Bar Example, 8 U. SAINT. THOMAS L.J. 194, 205 (2011) [hereinafter Specialty Bars].
207. Such a course may help lawyers avoid common ethical pitfalls related to management. See generally
R. Lisle Baker, Enhancing Professional Competence and Legal Excellence Through Teaching Law Practice
Management, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 375, 379 (1990) (“Focusing on how legal services are delivered also allows
students to realize that ethical conduct is something that can be enhanced by good management practice.”).
208. A study of graduates from Minnesota law schools found that seventy-nine percent reside in Minnesota
in the years after graduation. See Paul W. Mattessich & Cheryl W. Heilman, Career Paths of Minnesota Law
School Graduates: Does Gender Make a Difference, 9 LAW & INEQUALITY 59, 64 (1991); William D.
Henderson & Leonard Bierman, An Empirical Analysis of Lateral Lawyer Trends from 2000 to 2007: The
Emerging Equilibrium for Corporate Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1403 (2009) (concluding,
based on a study of lateral moves by corporate attorneys, that “[a]lthough large corporate law firms ostensibly
compete on a national or international scale, the competition for lawyers plays out in a very localized way.”).

198

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 35:163

practice. Prospective law students would be able to select the education that most
accords with their interests and career plans. However, as long as jurisdictions
treat bar exams as the sole pathway to licensure, there is little prospect of real
innovation and experimentation in legal education.209
B. POLICING LAW SCHOOLS

Although states can draft diploma privilege statutes to avoid constitutional
challenge and to meet the needs of their local legal markets, some state bars may
oppose the diploma privilege because they are trepidatious about the absence of a
“final check” on law school graduates in the form of bar exams.210 As noted,
Wisconsin lawyers generally hold a positive view of the state’s law schools,
partly explaining the success of its diploma privilege.211 In jurisdictions with
more law schools, practicing attorneys are likely to maintain that, without a final
check, law schools will admit and graduate unqualified students.
The ABA’s control over the law school accreditation process was intended to
assuage these fears.212 Nevertheless, some critics have charged that the ABA has
functioned like a “paper tiger” since it entered into a consent decree over antitrust
allegations twenty-five years ago.213 In 2016, the Department of Education was
sufficiently concerned about the ABA’s lax enforcement of legal education standards that it threatened to suspend the ABA’s accreditation power.214 The ABA
responded by tightening its standards and disaccrediting several law schools.215
The prospect of ABA enforcement constrains law schools from admitting and
graduating unqualified individuals, with or without bar exams.
Moreover, states need not defer to the ABA on law school accreditation. Until
the middle part of the twentieth century, the ABA’s accrediting decisions had little impact on attorney licensing,216 and a few states continue to accredit law
209. See, e.g., Arewa et al., supra note 196, at 946–48 (tracing the development of the case method as the
predominant form of law school instruction); Milan Markovic, The Law Professor Pipeline, 92 TEMPLE L.
REV. 813, 831 (2020) (“To this day, the predominant form of law school instruction is the case method that
Christopher Columbus Langdell created at Harvard Law School.”); Gillian Hadfield, Legal Barriers to
Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control Over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1689, 1712 (2008) (“Law school programs are, in fact, highly homogeneous. The program at most law
schools today, at its core, follows the model and content originally developed at Harvard in the 1870s . . .”).
210. NCBE, supra note 25, at 3.
211. See Moran, supra note 11, at 655; Stack Jr., supra note 54, at 123.
212. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 106; Barton, supra note 9, at 433 (“[C]onsumer protection, relies upon
two faulty assumptions: that the legal market is swamped by information asymmetry, and that substandard lawyers can cause irremediable harms to clients.”).
213. See James S. Heller & Simon F. Zagata, Back to the Future: ABA Law School Accreditation in the 21st
Century and America’s First Law School’s Battle to Survive in the 1970s, 111 LAW LIBR. J. 509, 515, 518
(2019). For a critique of the ABA-DOJ consent decree, see Judith Areen, Accreditation Reconsidered, 96 IOWA
L. REV. 1471, 1487–90 (2011).
214. See Heller & Zagata, supra note 213, at 516–17.
215. Id. at 517.
216. See Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. UNIV. L.Q.
1035, 1041 (2001).
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schools.217 Jurisdictions that have misgivings about the ABA’s enforcement of its
standards can, consistent with the antitrust laws, refuse to admit graduates from
certain ABA-accredited law schools.218
In the alternative, a state could extend the diploma privilege to graduates of
select law schools (private or public) but not to others. Utah and Oregon followed this approach in adopting a temporary diploma privilege, since terminated, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.219 Just as states can require
law schools to meet curricular benchmarks, they can impose admissions or
employment criteria as well.220 Any such decision might be regarded as elitist
and exclusionary but would at least remove an entry barrier for some prospective lawyers.221 As noted, for most law students, the bar exam is an expensive
formality; the socioeconomically disadvantaged are overrepresented among
never-passers.222
Jurisdictions could also mandate that aspiring attorneys achieve a certain level
of academic performance to qualify for the privilege. If jurisdictions were to
implement the policies, law students would be incentivized to excel in law school
for all three years.223 Jurisdictions could consider law schools’ selectivity and
their grading curves in delineating cutoffs.224 This option may be especially
appealing to states with a high number of law schools.
A final option would be for jurisdictions to place more emphasis on the MPRE
rather than seeking to limit the diploma privilege to graduates of select ABA-

217. California alone accredits twenty-three such law schools. See Law Schools in California Accredited by
the State Bar’s Committee of Bar Examiners, ST. BAR CAL., https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Admissions/LawSchool-Regulation/Law-Schools#cals [https://perma.cc/4M6M-2K57]. The law school that spurred the consent
decree between the ABA and DOJ is the Massachusetts School of Law. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc.
v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1038–39 (3d Cir.1997).
218. See generally Lao, supra note 216, at 1060 (discussing the concept of state action immunity under the
antitrust laws in the context of law schools).
219. See Derek T. Muller, Three Curiosities of Oregon’s Diploma Privilege for the 2020 Bar Exam, EXCESS
OF DEMOCRACY, (June 30, 2020), https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2020/6/three-curiosities-of-oregonsdiploma-privilege-rule-for-the-2020-bar-exam [https://perma.cc/94GJ-KQ5Z].
220. The Department of Education formerly used “gainful employment” to determine whether to extent student aid funding for non-degree programs at not-for-profit or public universities and all degree programs at forprofit universities. See Anne Xu, Better Information for Better Regulation: How Experimentalism Can Improve
the Gainful Employment Rule, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57, 68–69 (2014).
221. The decision would likely accord with the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nordgren v. Hafter, 789
F.2d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 1986); Moore v. Sup. Ct. of South Carolina, 447 F. Supp. 527, (D.S.C. 1977) (“The
Supreme Court has as much right to impose the law school requirement on practicing attorneys as it does to
impose it on those who are not attorneys.”).
222. See supra Part II.
223. As Professors Gulati, Sander, and Sockloskie have summarized: “Students routinely complain about
the vapidity of the final year of law school . . . And scores of scholars, judges, and practitioners have written
withering critiques of law school, usually focusing on the latter half of school and usually suggesting fairly fundamental changes.” Mitu Gulati, Richard Sander & Robert Sockloskie, The Happy Charade: An Empirical
Exam of the Third Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 236 (2001).
224. As set out fully in Part II, law school selectivity and law school grades are highly predictive of bar passage. See supra Part II.
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accredited law schools. As noted in Part II, the MPRE is a relatively recent addition to the attorney admission landscape and is specifically designed to test
knowledge of prevailing ethical standards. Familiarity with these standards does
not ensure ethical conduct, but it is usually a necessary condition.225 Thus, the
MPRE, unlike the bar exam, is relevant to all attorneys regardless of practice
area:
The law of lawyering affects everything that a lawyer does from the first day
of practice to the last. Viewed in practical terms, this body of law is more important to lawyers than any other subject matter in the law curriculum. Many
law graduates never deal with much of the legal doctrine that they learned as
part of the required curriculum . . . but every law graduate who practices law
needs to know the basic elements of the law of lawyering.226

The MPRE is also a short test for which candidates do not need to engage in
months of expensive and intensive study.227 Although MPRE scores and bar
exam scores are correlated,228 the latter exam is probably more apt to screen out
attorneys who do not have the time and resources to familiarize themselves with
all subjects within its purview.229
Unfortunately, states have undermined the MPRE by setting low minimum
pass scores. Depending on the jurisdiction, a lawyer or aspiring lawyer can pass
by answering between forty-eight and sixty percent of the questions correctly.230
Consequently, many attorneys find themselves ignorant of their professional obligations once in practice and decry violations as “hyper-technical.”231 Upon passing the MPRE, many jurisdictions effectively leave attorneys on their own to
navigate ethical dilemmas, leading them to rely on peers and informal
networks.232
If states were to adopt the diploma privilege, they could also shift resources
from bar exam administration to ethics training and discipline. The administration of bar exams imposes significant costs on both jurisdictions and test-takers;

225. Compare Philip Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral
Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244, 244 (1968) (“It is nothing new that even sacrosanct ethical and legal standards may bear little relation to actual behavior.”) with Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and
Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 159 (1996) (“Understanding [the
rules of lawyering] is a prerequisite to the moral reasoning and moral choice that flow from legal rules that confer discretion upon the lawyer.”).
226. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 225, at 158–59.
227. See generally Curcio, supra note 24, at 391 (noting that bar preparation courses cost nearly $3,000 dollars and that candidates with families have less time to study).
228. Case, supra note 115, at 31.
229. See generally Yakowitz, supra note 1, at 24 (demonstrating correlation between socioeconomic status
and bar exam passage).
230. Susan M. Case, The Testing Column: Standards on the MPRE, 75 BAR EXAMINER 35, 36 (2006).
231. Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 309,
373 (2004).
232. Specialty bars are one site of ethics socialization. See Specialty Bars, supra note 206, at 210.
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the NCBE earns nearly twenty-five million dollars a year from bar exams.233
Most states comparatively underinvest in ex post mechanisms of regulating attorney conduct. For example, attorney discipline budgets range from $433,226 in
Montana to $17,419,290 in Illinois, relatively paltry sums considering the potential magnitude of attorney misconduct.234
This failure to invest in ex post licensing mechanisms also extends to attorneys’ ethics training. Although most states require attorneys to engage in continuing legal education (CLE), ethics training is only a small part. An attorney can
usually satisfy the ethics requirement via one hour of coursework, and some
states have no ethics requirement at all.235 Ethics training may be particularly valuable to attorneys who work in small firms and practice in high-risk practice areas
and settings.236
Whether CLEs raise the quality of lawyering is unclear.237 However, Professor
Fagan has recently offered evidence that CLEs focused on ethics can reduce misconduct.238 Exploring variations in states’ changes to ethics CLE requirements,
Fagan demonstrates that increasing the ethics requirement by one credit reduces
attorney discipline by ten percent.239 Although the study was based on a relatively
small pool of attorneys, it stands to reason that yearly ethics training will have
more of an impact on practicing attorneys than courses and exams taken at the beginning of their careers.
The bar exam has provided regulators with a false sense of security and disincentivized innovation in legal education. By reconsidering their use of bar exams,
jurisdictions can refocus on the core issue: ensuring that lawyers receive the education and training needed to serve the public competently and ethically.

CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have shown that states can reintroduce the diploma privilege
without undermining public protection. While the bar exam is viewed today as a
crucial check on individual attorneys, it claimed a hold on the attorney admission
233. National Conference of Bar Examiners Tax Filings by Year (2020), PROPUBLICA, https://projects.
propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362472009 [https://perma.cc/245J-RQ4J] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
234. AM. BAR ASS’N, 2018 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS at 40-41 (2018), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2018sold-results.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ENN5-BPFB] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
235. See Fagan, supra note 149, at 6, 15–16.
236. See also Anderson & Muller, supra note 36, at 321 (suggesting that targeted interventions may be
needed for these groups).
237. See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, The “L” in “CLE” Stands for “Legal”, 40 VAL. L. REV. 311, 312
(2006); Mary Frances Edwards, Mandatory CLE: Shield or Sham?, 3 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 31 (1985); see
also Colleen G. Segall, Ethics in Mandatory CLE: An Overlooked Means for Improving the Standard of the
Profession, 6 J. PRO. LEGAL EDUC. 22, 33 (1988) (“With some re-organisation, greater regulation, the inclusion
of specialist and compulsory ethics units, MCLE could play an extremely important role in increasing the effectiveness and thereby the public image of the legal profession.”).
238. Fagan, supra note 149, at 14.
239. Id.
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process only in the latter half of the twentieth century. The organized bar
embraced the bar exam to eliminate perceived overcrowding in the legal profession that it attributed to law schools enrolling immigrants and racial minorities.
Some jurisdictions mandated bar exams just as the first classes of Black law
school graduates were poised to benefit from the diploma privilege. The bar
exam was never intended as a capstone to legal education, and it has led law
schools to focus disproportionately on teaching general legal principles and not
training lawyers for actual practice.
The continuing reliance on bar exams could be excused if there were evidence
that bar exams protect the public. Studies conducted heretofore fall short of establishing that performance on the bar exam has a direct effect on attorney discipline. Data from Wisconsin, the one state that currently maintains the diploma
privilege, demonstrate that attorneys who qualify via the diploma privilege are no
more or less likely to commit misconduct than other attorneys. If jurisdictions are
retaining bar exams because they are genuinely concerned about the potential for
increased misconduct, they have more direct means of addressing this problem,
including raising MPRE minimum pass scores, expanding continuing legal education focused on ethics, and investing in disciplinary mechanisms.
Contemporary attorney admissions barely resemble those of yesteryear, but
bar exams persist. Neither tradition nor fear of increased attorney misconduct
should dissuade jurisdictions from reconstituting the diploma privilege.

